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ABSTRACT
In what ways can changes to the structure of regulation (as well as other regulatory reforms) 
mitigate the effects of policies which trigger financial instability? More specifically policies, 
information   asymmetries   or   externalities   which   could   give   rise   to   bank   contagion, 
systemic/liquidity risks or procyclical effects?
Whilst acknowledging that accounting standards play a fundamental role in addressing problems 
which could contribute to information asymmetries and ultimately systemic risks, this paper also 
highlights why the type of regulatory structure, clear allocation of responsibilities between 
regulators, as well as measures aimed at fostering accountability, constitute vital elements which 
could serve as safeguards in mitigating procyclical effects (as well as other factors) which could 
trigger financial instability. In achieving this aim, the paper focusses on the rationale for fair value 
accounting, as well as problematic issues arising from its implementation.
The adoption of international accounting standards is considered to have a vital role in contributing 
to financial stability. This paper will also illustrate how the implementation of accounting standards 
and policies, in certain instances, have contrasted with Basel Committee initiatives aimed at 
mitigating procyclicality and facilitating forward looking provisioning. More importantly, the paper 
will highlight how and why differences between regulatory and accounting policies could (and 
should) be mitigated.
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The aftermath of the recent global Financial Crisis has witnessed changes to the structure of 
financial regulation, as well as policy measures aimed at fostering financial stability. These 
respective developments are evidenced by  reforms currently being undertaken in the UK and 
legislative   proposals   being   adopted   by  the   European   Commission   to   consolidate   Financial 
Supervision in Europe.
Whilst a previous paper
2  focussed on ways whereby auditing standards could contribute in 
mitigating the devastating consequences of the recent Financial Crisis, the present paper focuses on 
the issue of fair value accounting, the benefits attributed to such measurements – as well as its 
disadvantages. Some problems identified with international accounting and auditing standards prior 
to the 2007/2009 Financial Crisis, as identified in the paper include:
3
- The fact that international accounting and auditing standards, on their own, do not prescribe 
rules which provide guidance of how regulation should be effectively carried out
- The inappropriateness of the scope of application of international standards.
Within this context, the role of regulation and regulatory authorities is emphasised. This also 
underlines why auditing and accounting standards serve as complements in addressing issues 
relating to financial stability, why changes to regulatory structures and further measures aimed at 
addressing systemic risks will be necessary to facilitate the (International Accounting Standards 
Board) IASB and Basel Committee's efforts.
The paper will commence with a section (section two) which discusses measures and initiatives that 
have recently been undertaken by national and supranational authorities in their goal to foster 
financial stability. The section will also highlight the focus which is increasingly being placed on 
macro prudential measures as well as measures aimed at mitigating procyclicality.
Section three will then be linked to section two through the all important need to foster 
accountability. It will also address how differences in regulatory and accounting policies could be 
better reconciled – hence facilitating regulatory convergence as well as the harmonisation of 
accounting and auditing standards.
Having considered the importance of transparency and the disclosure of information in fostering 
accountability (under section three), the bridge to section four will then consider the principal 
1 School of Social Sciences and Law, Oxford Brookes University. Email marianneojo@hotmail.com 
2 See M Ojo, „The Role of the IASB and Auditing Standards in the Aftermath of the 2008/2009 Financial Crisis“ 
European Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, September 2010, pp. 604–623
3 ibidadvantage attributed to fair value measurements – that is the quality of information it provides. In so 
doing, it will link this discussion to section four which considers the contribution of fair value 
measurements to pro cyclicality and systemic risks. Section five then proceeds with an analysis and 
discussion of recent efforts which have been undertaken at supranational level – efforts aimed at 
consolidating financial supervision. In this context, it will consider developments and initiatives 
which have resulted in the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board and the European System 
of Financial Supervisors. It will also highlight the distinction drawn between the functions of these 
bodies through their roles in micro and macro prudential supervision.
The concluding section will then consider further areas which need to be addressed under the 
recurring theme of this paper: that is, the need to harmonise regulatory and accounting policies in 
achieving the goal of promoting financial stability.
B. Analysis of Recent Efforts Aimed at Facilitating Financial Stability: Efforts undertaken by 
national authorities, supra national authorities and international standard setting bodies 
Recent measures aimed at fostering financial stability have focussed on macro prudential measures 
as well as measures aimed at mitigating pro cyclicality. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision has been engaged in several initiatives, in collaboration with its introduction of Basel 
III, which are aimed at mitigating procyclicality. Such initiatives include:
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- the assessment and dampening of the cyclicality of minimum capital requirements;
- the facilitation of forward-looking provisioning; 
- the adoption of a regulatory framework for capital conservation and countercyclical buffers;
-  the introduction of a minimum leverage ratio. 
According to Weber, „financial regulation can be enacted by governmental authorities such as 
parliaments, executive bodies and public institutions, and self regulatory agencies – the latter either 
having a delegated competence to devise regulations or to impose regulations on members of a 
specific market sector in a non mandatory way.“
5 He also adds that the experience of the Financial 
Crisis and the present situation in financial market law, requires a rethink of theoretical concepts 
underlying international financial regulation and supervision.
6
The need for changes to the structure of financial regulation in the UK became evident following 
the Northern Rock debacle which exposed weaknesses in the tripartite arangement between the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), the Bank of England and the Treasury. The tripartite regime is 
to be abolished – with the result that a new prudential financial services regulator will operate (as a 
subsidiary of the Bank of England).
7 
4  R Moreno, „Policymaking from a Macro prudential Perspective“ BIS Working Paper No 336, January 2011 at page 
13 of 24
5 R H Weber, „Mapping and Structuring International Financial Regulation – A Theoretical Approach“ 20 (5) 
European Banking Law Review (2009) at page 653
6 Insodoing, he further elaborates by exmaining „three closely related theoretical concepts which offer a valuable 
framework for analysis without pre determining how regulatory responsibilities should be allocated.“ See RH 
Weber, „Multilayered Governance in International Financial Regulation and Supervision“ Journal of International 
Economic Law 13(3) 683-704 at page 687
7 See Speech at The Lord Mayor’s Dinner for Bankers & Merchants of the City of London by The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, The Rt Hon George Osborne MP, at Mansion House <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_12_10.htm>
In the words of the Chancellor,
„The Bank of England was mandated to focus on consumer price inflation to the exclusion of other things.The 
Treasury saw its financial policy division drift into a backwater.The FSA became a narrow regulator, almost entirely 
focussed on rules based regulation.No-one was controlling levels of debt, and when the crunch came no one knew 
who was in charge.“ see ibidPrior to the Northern Rock debacle and indeed the onset of the recent Financial Crisis, many doubts 
had been expressed about the tripartite arrangement which existed between the Financial Services 
Authority, the Bank of England and the Treasury. The transfer of the Bank of England's supervisory 
powers to the FSA through the Bank of England Act 1998 had come to many as a huge surprise – 
since the Bank is better equipped in several respects relating to financial stability and should ideally 
have been involved (to a greater extent) in financial supervision than was previously the case. The 
aftermath of the 2007/08 financial crisis has witnessed the enactment of legislation such as the 
Banking Act of 2009 which has not only introduced greater statutory powers for the Bank of 
England, but also the Special Resolution Regime.
8 
In addressing certain fundamental questions
9 related to macro prudential regulation, an interesting 
observation was made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in underlining reasons for the intention 
to assign to the Bank of England control of macro-prudential regulation and oversight of 
microprudential regulation.:
10
„Only independent central banks have the broad macroeconomic understanding, the authority and 
the knowledge required to make the kind of macro-prudential judgments that are required now and 
in the future.“ 
He also highlighted another important lesson which was drawn from the recent Crisis, namely 
that:
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- because central banks are the lenders of last resort, they need to be familiar with every 
aspect of the institutions that they may have to support, they must also be responsible for 
day-to-day micro-prudential regulation as well - the case being particularly strong where the 
banking system is highly concentrated as it is in the UK, where the boundary between micro 
and macro-prudential regulation is not easy to define.
In Lastra and Garicano's opinion, „the macro supervisor should be less independent than central 
banks are now in their monetary policy responsibilities.“
12 They also respond to the question „How 
can giving freedom (ie independence) to unelected officials be reconciled with a society remaining 
democratic?“ with the answer: „through accountability“. 
8 For a consideration of developments which have necessitated greater involvement and a greater role for central 
banks in financial regulation and supervision, see   M Ojo, „ Central Bank's Role and Involvement in Bank 
Regulation: Lender of Last Resort Arrangements and the Special Resolution Regime (SRR) http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/15771/ and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1420812
9 See Speech at The Lord Mayor’s Dinner for Bankers & Merchants of the City of London by The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, The Rt Hon George Osborne MP, at Mansion House <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_12_10.htm> 
In conceding to the fact that „fundamental problems of culture and regulatory structure still appear to exist“, he also 
drew attention to the following questions:
How would less box-ticking and more exercise of judgement be ensured?
What are the tools of macroprudential regulation and who should exercise them?
Can the macroprudential regulator do their job if they don’t have an intimate knowledge of what is happening in 
individual firms?
10 See Speech at The Lord Mayor’s Dinner for Bankers & Merchants of the City of London by The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, The Rt Hon George Osborne MP, at Mansion House <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_12_10.htm>
11 ibid
12 See Principle Five, RM Lastra and L Garicano, „ Towards a New Archictecture for Financial Stability: Seven 
Principles“ Journal of International Economic Law 13(3) at page 616C. Enforced Self Regulation and Accountability.
In terms of flexibility, compliance, enforcement and accountability, the Enforced Self Regulation 
model is considered to confer greater benefits than self regulation.
13  “Enforced self regulation 
represents an extension and individualization of the “co-regulation.” theory. Co regulation, as 
distinct from enforced self regulation, is usually taken to mean industry- association self regulation 
with some oversight and/or ratification by government.
14
Although the Enforced Self Regulation model is considered to offer greater possibilities whereby 
corporate agents could be held accountable – than is the case under self regulation, there is greater 
scope for such a model to be optimised under the model which incorporates both Enforced Self 
Regulation and Regulatory Competition.
With the Enforced Self Regulation and Regulatory Competition model, whilst the firm is subject to 
mandatory regulations under the Enforced Self Regulation model, it is also subjected to a second 
level of regulation under Basel II (meta regulation) – which serves as an additional check on the self 
regulatory processes undertaken by the firm. This constitutes a reason why such a model is 
considered to provide greater accountability than Enforced Self Regulation.
Such a model is represented diagrammatically below:
Basel Committee----->    Meta Regulation -->      State ---> Enforced Self Regulation -->
Firm
Other actors involved in the model could include trade associations and bodies which represent 
industry and consumer interests, and non governmental organisations.
Disclosure   and   transparency   constitute   fundamental   elements   which   foster   accountability. 
Transparency is considered to be „a beneficial element in agency relationships because more 
information about the agent makes the agent more accountable to the pricipal.“
15  However 
circumstances whereby „committing to the concealment of certain kind of information“ could prove 
beneficial to the principal, have also been identified.
16
Information, certainty and uncertainty, transparency and disclosure are all factors which contribute 
to risk taking levels and bank contagion. The potential of banking regulations and disclosure 
requirements to impact risk taking levels is not only dependent on certain factors such as the 
dissemination   of   information   to   appropriate   recipients,  appropriate   volume   of   disseminated 
information, when to disseminate such information, but also on other factors such as effective 
corporate governance measures aimed fostering monitoring, supervision and accountability. Ways 
whereby the disclosure and transparency of vital information for investors could serve as a source 
13 For further information on Enforced Self Regulation, Self Regulation and Cooperative and Competitive Self 
Regulation, see M Ojo, „Cooperative and Competitive Enforced Self Regulation: The Role of Governments, Private 
Actors and Banks in Corporate Responsibility“ <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1616235> and 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22918/1/MPRA_paper_22918.pdf
14I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Oxford University Press at 
page 102; Also see P Grabosky and J Braithwaite Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business 
Regulatory Agencies, (1986) at page 83 Oxford University Press, Melbourne.
15A Prat, „The Wrong Kind of Transparency“ LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE439 October 2002 at page 5 of 51 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1160984>
16 See ibid at page 46 of 51of impediment to financial stability (facilitate the spread of systemic risks), are therefore also 
dependent on the timing of the disclosure of such information.
Fair value measurements are favoured in contrast to historical accounting principally because of the 
value of information they provide and contain – namely: more complete, accurate and timely 
information. However certain concerns have been raised in relation to the extent of their use – 
particularly in the aftermath of the recent Financial Crisis. The following section is dedicated to a 
consideration of fair value measurements and their impact on the recent Financial Crisis.
D. Contribution of Fair Value Measurements to Pro cyclicality and Systemic Risks
As highlighted in a previous paper,
17  accounting standards' contribution to procyclicality and 
particularly, the pro cyclical nature of accounting, is attributed to two principal elements: 
- Fair value measurements
- The treatment of impairments.
Whilst results of a certain sample generated by Khan
18 illustrate and support the evidence that „a 
more fair value-oriented accounting regime is associated with an increase in bank contagion above 
and beyond that which exists as a result of trade and financial linkages in the banking industry“, 
Laux and Leuz argue in contrast (and based on their analysis), that fair value accounting (frequently 
also referred to as mark-to-market accounting), is unlikely to have contributed to the severity of the 
2008 Financial Crisis in a major way.
19 Furthermore, they add that „while there may have been 
downward spirals or asset fire sales in certain markets, little evidence supports the fact that such 
effects are the result of fair value accounting.“
ii) Advantages and Disadvantages of Fair Value Measurements.
The principal advantage attributed to fair value measurements has already been highlighted – 
namely, the value of information they incorporate in the financial statements – such value being 
more complete and accurate than that provided by historical cost accounting.
Problems identified with fair value accounting, as highlighted by Ball, include:
20
- Market liquidity is a potentially important issue in practice and spreads could be large 
enough to cause substantial uncertainty about fair values.
- In illiquid markets, trading by managers could influence traded – as well as quoted prices 
hence allowing them to manipulate fair value estimates.
17 M Ojo,  „The Role of the IASB and Auditing Standards in the Aftermath of the 2008/2009 Financial Crisis“ 
European Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, September 2010, pp. 604–623 at page 612; Also see M Grande, Accounting 
and Procyclicality, Conference on Financial Reporting in a Changing World at page 2
18 U Khan, „Does Fair Value Accounting Contribute to Systemic Risks in the Banking Industry?“ at page 4 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1327596>
19 See C Laux and C Leuz, „Did Fair Value Accounting Contribute to the Financial Crisis?“ ECGI Working Paper 
Series in Finance, Working Paper No 266 October 2009 at page 3. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1487905>
20 R Ball, „International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS): Pros and Cons for Investors“ at pages 21 and 22 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=929561>- The potential for fair value accounting to become „mark to model“ accounting when liquid 
market prices are not available
- Tendency for fair value accounting to increase opportunities for manipulation when „mark 
to model“ accounting is employed to simulate market prices (since managers are able to 
influence both the choice of models and the parameter estimates).
E. Recent Efforts Aimed at Consolidating Financial Supervision at Supra national Level
In line with arrangements aimed at „sustainably reinforcing financial stability throughout the EU, 
ensuring that the same basic technical rules are applied and enforced consistently, identifying risks 
in the system at an early stage, and facilitating the ability to act together far more effectively in 
emergency   situations   and   in   resolving   disagreements   among   supervisors“,   the   European 
Commission adopted draft legislation in 2009 which created the new European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) and the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS).
21
Functions of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) are „to monitor and assess risks to the 
stability of the financial system as a whole ("macro-prudential supervision"), provide early warning 
of systemic risks that may be building up and, where necessary, recommendations for action to deal 
with these risks.“
22
The European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) serves to supervise „individual financial 
institutions   ("micro-prudential   supervision"),   consisting   of   a   network   of   national   financial 
supervisors working in tandem with new European Supervisory Authorities, created by the 
transformation of existing Committees for the banking securities and insurance and occupational 
pensions sectors.“
23
In the aftermath of the launch of the three European Supervisory Authorities on the 1 January 2011, 
the Commission proposed to make changes to legislation in the areas of insurance and securities 
regulation – measures aimed at facilitating the efficient functioning of the new authorities.
24
21 See European Commission, „Commission Adopts Legislative Proposals to Strengthen Financial Supervision in 
Europe“ <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1347    >.     The European System of Financial 
Supervisors comprises national supervisors and the three new European Supervisory Authorities for the banking, 
securities and insurance and occupational pension sectors.
22 Ibid; „The ESRB will have the power to issue recommendations and warnings to Member States (including the 
national supervisors) and to the European Supervisory Authorities, which will have to comply or else explain why 
they have not done so. The heads of the ECB, national central banks, the European Supervisory Authorities, and 
national supervisors, will participate in the ESRB . The creation of the ESRB being in line with several initiatives at 
multilateral level or outside the EU, including the creation of a Financial Stability Board by the G20.“
23 „In relation to micro-prudential supervision and up till 2010, there were three financial services committees for 
micro-financial supervision (supervision of individual financial institutions) at EU level, with advisory powers only: 
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Committee (CEIOPS) and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR).“ see European 
Commission,   „Financial   Supervision:   Additional     Legislative   Proposals   (January   2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/committees/index_en.htm>
24 See ibid. The ESAs, which replace the former European Committees for the banking, securities and insurance and 
occupational   pensions   sectors,   are   the   European   Banking  Authority   (EBA),   the   European   Insurance   and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). In 
cooperation and coordination with nationally-based supervisors, the ESAs are in place to ensure that rules are 
applied in a rigorous and consistent fashion throughout the European Union, to monitor developments within the 
financial system as well as to detect potential risks to financial stability.
The trio of new ESAs have taken over all of the functions of the previous committees, and in addition have certain 
additional competences, including the following:
· developing proposals for technical standards to better define common standards for the application of 
legislative acts, respecting better regulation principles;resolving cases of disagreement between national 
supervisors, where legislation requires them to cooperate or to agree;contributing to ensuring consistent In line with measures aimed at mitigating procyclicality and its facilitation of forward-looking 
provisioning, the Basel Committee is supporting a move towards an expected loss approach in 
accounting standards - this being in line with risk management considerations that suggest that 
„loan-loss provisions should be forward looking.“
25 This approach is contrasted
26 to accounting 
standards, and particularly IAS 39, which traditionally require banks to provision based on specific 
“incurred loss” not expected loss. Further, it is added that „whilst the adoption of international 
accounting standards contributes to financial stability by limiting the scope for arbitrary earnings 
manipulation, in a number of cases it has implied lower loan-loss provisioning  than many 
supervisors would have considered prudent during the expansion phase of the cycle.“
27
F.  Conclusion: Further Issues to Be Addressed
Harmonising Views Relating to Accounting and Regulatory Definitions
1) Expected Losses and Non Expected Losses: 
Capital constitutes a means of addressing expected losses – as well as recent initiatives undertaken 
by the Basel Committee to focus on buffers.
According to  Laeven and Majnoni,
28
  regulatory capital, “should cope with the occurrence of 
unexpected losses – that is, losses that are large but infrequent and further, loan loss reserves 
should, instead, cope with expected losses.” In reconciling the different views held about bank 
capital requirements, they propose a partitioning of regulatory capital which is based not only on 
terms relating to priority (as is the case for Tier One and Tier Two Capital), but also (and foremost)
on risk management considerations.
29
2) Addressing weaknesses in existing macro prudential arrangements
Recent initiatives aimed at fostering financial stability (as evidenced by steps taken in the UK) have 
resulted in the macroprudential supervisory function being transferred to the central bank. The 
Financial Services Authority is considered to have been endowed with adequate mechanisms of 
accountability.
30  It will be quite interesting to see how the new prudential financial services 
regulator operates as a subsidiary of the Bank of England.
The relationship between micro and micro supervisors, it is argued, „must be articulated through a 
management   by  exception   system  involving   direct   authority  of   the  macro   supervisor   over 
enforcement and allocation of tasks.“
31
application of existing and future technical EU rules (including through peer reviews);a coordination role in 
emergency situations.
25„That is, take into account expected credit losses over the medium term „ See R Moreno, Policymaking from a macro 
prudential perspective BIS Working Paper No 336, January 2011 at page 13 of 24
26 ibid
27 ibid
28 See L Laeven and G Majnoni, „Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic Slowdowns: Too Much, Too Late? at page 6
29 ibid
30 See M Ojo, „The Financial Services Authority: A Model of Improved Accountability?“ Global Journal of Business 
Research, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 83-96, 2007
31 RM Lastra and L Garicano, „ Towards a New Archictecture for Financial Stability: Seven Principles“ Journal of At supra national level and as is the case with the harmonisation of accounting and auditing 
standards, the EU faces a daunting task in respect of supervision and harmonisation. In response to 
the difficulties presented by convergence, the vital role it assumes in the standard setting process, 
and given the fact that it is considered by some to be an unfeasible objective, calls have been made 
for a re-think of the way in which it is implemented.
32
3) Enforcement
As recently acknowledged by the Basel Committee,
33 „better and more intrusive supervision at the 
global level“, as well as the implementation of stronger mechanisms aimed at ensuring that the 
execution of standards and regulations established by the Committee and approved by the G20, are 
successfully enforced, constitute some of the efforts which have been undertaken and which need to 
be undertaken, if enforcement is to be facilitated.
Why should differences between regulatory and accounting policies be mitigated? Because 
mitigating such differences could facilitate convergence – as well as financial stability. A greater 
degree of oversight by the State in respect of its regulation of accountancy bodies (and the 
accountancy profession - as opposed to a system where self regulation of the accountancy bodies 
predominantly exists), as well as greater collaboration between international standard setters such as 
the IASB, FASB and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, would also facilitate the 
convergence of accounting, auditing and regulatory policies.
International Economic Law 13(3) at page 597
32 The Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE) in particular, has called for a re think in the way in which 
convergence is implemented. See FEE's statement „Future Approach to Setting Global   Financial Reporting 
Standards:   A   New   Approach   to   Setting   Global   Financial   Reporting   Standards“   at   page   2 
<http://www.iasplus.com/europe/0907feepolicy.pdf>
33 In order to achieve this goal, the Committee will also be making efforts to conduct follow up and peer reviews whose 
areas of focus will include the common interpretating of standards and potential sources of regulatory arbitrage. See 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Basel III and Beyond“ and Remarks of Nout Wellink, Chairman, Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and President, De Nederlandsche Bank in relation to the conference High Level 
Meeting on Better Supervision and Better Banking in a Post-crisis Era, FSI and EMEAP Working Group on Banking 
Supervision (hosted by Bank Negara Malaysia) on the 17
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